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MABEL BLACK et aL, Respondents, v. CUTTER LABORATORIES (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Arbitration-Award-Validity.-An arbitra.tion award which
directs that a mem ber of Communist party who is dedicated
to that party's program of sabotage, force, violence and the
like be reinstated to employment in a plant which produces
antibiotics used by both the military and civilians, is against
public policy as expressed in federal and state laws, is illegal
and void, and will not be enforced by courts.
[2] Master and Servant-Specific Performance of Oontract for
Personal Services - Disloyalty to Employer - Defenses.-A
private employer, particularly one largely engaged in supplying manufactured products to government, to its armed forces
and to public at large, should not be required by state action
through its courts to retain in or restore to e:rployment a
person who would not be entitled to .;:t,f..e employment and
who is known to have dedicated hers(-I, LO service of foreign
power and to practice of sabotage to the end of overthrowing
our government.
[3] Id.-Duties-Loyalty-Implications of Membership in Oommunist Party.-A member of Communist Party cannot be loyal
to his private employer as against any directive of his Communist master.
[4] Id.-Oontinuing Ground of Discharge-Nonwaiver-Defenses.
-Employe's membership in Communist Party and her sustained participation in its activities is a type of continuing
disloyal activity which, as matter of public policy, her employer should not be held to have waived by its failure to
discharge her earlier than it did, though it had knowledge
of such membership.
[5] Oontracts-Legality-Effect of IUegality-Estoppel.-Parties
cannot be estopped from relying on defenses based on considerations of public policy.

McK. Dig. References: [1] Arbitration, § 24; [2, 4, 6-8] Master
and Servant, § 33: [3] Master and Servant, § 10.5; [5] Contracts,
§ 74; [9] Labor, § 3a.
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[6] Master and Servant-Active Membership in Communist Party
and Disloyalty to Employer as Continuing Ground for Discharge.-Where employe's membership in Communist Party
was not shown or asserted by her to have been instance of
past error but appears to have been studied and calculated
choice of person of some intellectual attainment and to have
been persisted in on active and devoted basis at time of hearing
of arbitration board as to whether her discharge violated
collective bargaining agreement for personal services between
employer and union of which she was a member, this was an
adequate ground for refusing to employ her (whether by original refusal to hire or by discharge) and was a continuing
ground which was available to employer at any time during its
existence.
[7] Id.-Right and Duty of Employer to Protect Customers and
Employes Against Danger of Sabotage, Violence, etc.-Employer largely engaged in supplying manufactured products to
government and public has right to protect itself and its customers against clear and present danger of continuing a
Communist Party member in its employ, and also duty to take
such action as it deems wise to preserve order in its plant and
to protect its other employes, both union and nonunion, against
same danger and possibility of sabotage, force, violence and
the like.
[8] Id.-Lack of Specific Governmental Regulation - Public
Policy-Duty of Court to Give Specific Effect To.-Fact
that employer is not specifically obliged by governmental rp.gulation to discharge employe who is member of Communist
Pal'ty does not affect its right to do so or the impelling public
poli~y which militates against order for her reinstatement:
goV'~rmnent is expected to step in only where employer has
failed or is unable to act for himself, and he is not obligated.
to await a governmental decree before taking steps to pl'otect
himself or to exercise his right to discharge employes who
on established facts are dedicated to be disloyal to him, to be
likewise disloyal to labor union they purport to serve, and
who constitute a continuing risk to both employing company
and the public depending on company's products.
[9] Labor-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Discharge of Employe as not Violation of Agreement.-A finding of arbitration
board, to which dispute of employe's discharge was submitted
under collective bargaining agreement between employer and
union of which employe was member, that employe was discharged because! of her labor union activities is untenable in
view of fact that her activities were not union activities but
were Communist Party activities, and in view of fact that

[9] See Cal.Jur., Labor, § 26; Am.Jur., Labor, § 96 et seq.
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she sought cmployment at cmployer's plant so that she could
more actively and effectively carryon program and activities
of Communist Party.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco based on an order con·
firming an arbitration award. Edward Molkenbuhr, Judge.
Reversed with directions.
Johnson & Stanton, Gardiner Johnson and Thomas E.
Stanton, Jr., for Appellant.
Edises & Treuhaft, Bertram Edises, Henry F. Saunders and
Edises. Treuhaft, Grossman and Grogan for Respondents.
Charles R. Garry, George G. Olshausen, Charles P. Scully,
Arthur J. Goldberg, Wirin, Rissman & Okrand, A. L. Wirin,
Fred Okrand, Abraham Gorenfeld, Jay A. Darwin and
IIRwrence Speiser as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
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SCHAUER, J .-Cutter Laboratories, Inc., appeals from a
judgment entered upon the granting of an order confirming
the award of an arbitration board. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 1291-1293.) By the award. rendered by two of the three
arbitrators with the third dissenting, it was held that appellant (hereinafter sometimes termed the company) had discharged one of its employes in violation of a collective bar·
gaining agreement between appellant and the Bio-Lab Union
(hereinafter sometimes called the union) of Local 225, United
Office and Professional Workers of America, and that the
employe was entitled to reinstatement and to back pay limited
by the bargaining agreement to eight weeks regular pay less
any outside earnings or unemployment compensation received
during such period. We have concluded that, upon the undisputed evidence and upon the facts found by the arbitration board, the company is correct in its contention that the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, that the award is contrary to law, that it would contravene public policy for the
courts of this state to enforce reinstatement of the discharged
employe, and that the judgment must therefore be reversed.
From extensive findings made by the arbitration board it
appears that the employer, Cutter Laboratories, Inc., with
offices and laboratories locuted in Berkeley, manufactures
and sells throughout the United States and certain foreign
countries vaccines, serums, antitoxins and other antibiotics
for both civilian and military use. During World War II
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the company was subjel"l lo st.riugeut sct'llrity eoutI'o! by federal authorities, and its prorlu~ls anci processes are said to be
peculiarly subject to sabotage. Since World War II the company has been under no specific contract obligation to any
governmental agency to discharge employes who are "bad
security risks"; any obligation to take such steps grows out
of the duties it owes generally to its customers, its dealers, its
employes, and its stockholders.
'rhe Bio-Lab Union of Local 225, United Office and Professional Workers of America C.1.0., was recognized in
February, 1944, by the company pursuant to a National Labor
Relations Board election. It is a union "generally denominated as 'left-wing'" and it as well as the U.O.P.W.A. was
expelled from the C.I.O. in March, 1950.
The discharged employe, Mrs. Doris Walker, graduated
from the University of California School of Jurisprudence in
1942, and is an active member of The State Bar of California.
She was elected to Phi Beta Kappa ~nd to the editorial board
of the California Law Review. From 1942 to 1944 she was
employed as an enforcement attorney with the federal Office
of Price Administration in San Francisco and from 1944 t(l
1946 as an attorney with a firm of lawyers in the same city.
She left the law firm and secured employment as a cannery
worker sorting and trimming vegetables in three canneries in
Oakland and San Francisco and (later in 1946) as an organ·
izer for the Food and Tobacco and Agricultural Workers
Union. She testified that she went to law school "because I
was interested in becoming a labor lawyer" and that she left
the law firm because her "time was spent on routine civil
matters ... and I became dissatisfied with my work and felt
that I would rather take a more active role in the field ill
which I was interested and so I quit in order to take a job
in a plant."
In October, 1946, Mrs. Walker sought employment at Cutter
Laboratories and filled out an application form supplied by
the company, on which under the heading of "Education"
she concealed her attendance at law school, her law degree,
and her admission to practice law in this state. Under the
heading "Previous Employment" she concealed her entire
previous employment record and showed a false employment
as file clerk for six or eight months in 1939 by "John Tripp
Att 'y," which the company later discovered to be a fictitious
name. Mrs. Walker also gave a dentist and a lawyer in
San Francisco as references, but at her request their letters
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of rp,p.ommennation to the company did not reveal her subterfllg<'. Sh~ states that she intentionally deceived the company
becaul'ie of her belief it wonld not em ploy her if she were
truthful. The company hired her as label clerk in its production planning department, and in April, 1949, she became a
clerk typist in the purchasing department.
At the company plant Mrs. \Valker became active in union
affairs and in April, 1947, was elected shop chairman and
also a member of the executive board of Local 225. Late in
1948 she was elected chief shop steward; her duties as steward took her to all departments in the plant except the
executive and administrative departments and primarily entailed representing the union in grievances arising c.nder its
collective bargaining agreement with the company. In th(>
spring of 1949 she was elected president of Local 225; her
term expired December 15, 1949, and a new president was
elected.
Meanwhile, in May, 1946, following proceedings before the
National Labor Relations Board, the company and the union
entered into a contract; in January, 1947, the wage provisions
thereof were opened and a 10 cent hourly wage increase
agreed upon. In April, 1947, Mrs. Walker had been elected
shop chairman and during the same month she and another
union official learned that they were being investigated by
the company as to past employment, character, and Communist affiliation. In June, 1947, the union served notice of
intention to amend the contract and at the same time filed
with the National Labor Relations Board an unfair labor
practice charge against the company based on the investigations. A week-long strike ensued in August, 1947, which was
settled following the intervention of Harry Bridges and as a
result of negotiation with him. June 9, 1949, the contract
was again opened, solely as to wages, and November 30, 1949,
a two-year contract was agreed upon; on October 6, 1949,
during the negotiations and at a time when company officials
were angry at certain activities of Mrs. Walker purportedly
in connection with union demands, the company's discharge
of Mrs. Walker which is here involved took place.
At the time of the discharge a company official read to Mrs.
Walker the following notice:
"Mrs. Walker: As you are aware, the company has known
for some time that when you applied for work with Cutter
Laboratories on October 4 1946, you made a number of false
representations on your' Application for Employment'.

.Jall.]!.!55J
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"As we know now, you falsified the statement of YOUl
('dueation so as to conceal the fact that you had completed a
law shcoo) [sic] course at the University of California's School
of J urispl'udence at Berkeley in May, 1942. You con(~ea]ed
ihe facts that you received the degree of Bachelor of Laws
in May, 1942, and that you were admitted to the State Bar of
CaJifornia on December 8, 1942. You concealed that since
I hat date you have at all times been admitted and entitled to
practice as an attorney before all of the Conrts of California.
"We know now that by falsification of the name of a previous employer, you concealed the fact that from June, 1942
to February, 1944 you were employed by the Federal Government's Office of Price Administration, including employment as an Enforcement Attorney at a salary of abont
$3,200.00 a year.
"We know now that you deliberately concealed from us
that from February 1944 to December, 1945 you were employed as an attorney by Gladstein, Grossman, Sawyer and
Edises, a well-known firm of lawyers specializing in labor cases.
"You know that a few weeks ago the 'Labor Herald', the
official CIO newspaper, stated that the National Labor Relations Board had sustained a cannery firm that had discharged
you for refusing to answer whether or not you were a Communist.
"We have checked the records. We know now that you
deliberately concealed that in 1946, just before you applied
for work here, you were employed by a series of cannerie~
and had been discharged by them.
"Ordinarily, an employee of the Company would be discharged immediately for falsifying material facts on an
'Application for Employment'. Because you were an officer
of the Union we kept you on the pay roll rather than open
ourselves to a charge of persecuting a union officer. We have
given your case careful consideration because we know very
well that no matter how strong the case against you there
will be a claim of discrimination because of union activities.
"Because no employer wants to become involved in a dispute of that kind we have been patient and deliberate in our
consideration of your misconduct.
"On October 1, 1948, when you testified under oath before
a Trial Examiner of the National TJubor Relations Board,
you refused to answer the question as to whether or not you
were a member of the Communist Party.
"You refused to answer under oath the question as to
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whether or not you were or had been a member of the Federal
'Yorkers' Branch No.3 of the Communist Party.
, , You refused to testify under oath whether or not you were
or had bcen a member of the South Side Professional Club of
the Communist Party.
"We are convinced now, that you were and still are a
member of the Communist Party, that you were a member
of the Federal Workers' Branch No. 3 of the Communist
Party, and that you were a member of the South Side Professional Club of the Communist Party.
"Our recent investigation of your past record has uncovered previously unknown conduct that goes far beyond a
mere concealment of material facts. We have just compleied
a thorough investigation and have a full report upon your
past activities. We realize now the importance of the facts
that you concealed from us. We realize the full implications
of your falsification and misrepresentations. A follow-up and
investigation of the 'Labor Heralds' recent revelations has
uncovered a situation far more grave than we expected.
"We are convinced now that for a number of years, you
have been and still are a member of the Communist Party.
We are convinced beyond any question that for a number of
years you have participated actively in the Communist Party's
activities.
"The nature of our company's business requires more than
the usual precaution against sabotage and subversion. Upon
a disclosure that any employee is a member of the Communist
Party, or has participated in other subversive or revolutionary
activity, we conceive it to be the responsibility of management
to take action.
"Confronted with such a situation, any inclination to be
lellient or to grant a union official special consideration is
out. In the face of your record there is no alternative open
to us except to terminate your services at once. Accordingly,
you are notified now that you are discharged for the causes
mentioned. You wi11 be paid the full amount due to you
promptly. "
"Shortly after" the notice was read to Mrs. Walker, it
was likewise read to plant employes at a meeting called by
rhe company. At the meeting statements were made by company officials "either to the entire group or in private discus-;ion afterward, advising- f'lllployees 'to g~t ont of that lpft-wing
Huion' and telling them that 'nothing- hut a left-wing union
would press for wa~(' incre>ns('s at this time.'" Following the
discharge of Mrs. 'Valker negotiations between the union and

.
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the company continued, and as already mentiolled a hvo-year
contract was agreed upon on November 30, 1949; it provided
for wage increases and other contract changes. The company
also agreed to, and did, pending the holding of a union-shop
election, join the union in urging all eligible employes and
all newly-hired eligible employes to become and remain members in good standing of the union.
The arbitration board further found that on October 5,
1949. following a grievance meeting with union representatives earlier in the day and prior to discharging Mrs. Walker
on October 6, officials of the company met with its attorneys
and considered evidence which the attorneys had marshalled
and which may be summarized as follows:
a. State Bar records showed no California lawyer named
John Tripp (a name given by Mrs. Walker to the company,
as a previous employer), but that there was such a lawyer
with the given names of John Tripp; it developed that he
was Mrs. Walker's supervisor in the O.P.A. (1942-1944).
b. A transcript of N.L.R.B. hearings of September 30 and
October 1, 1948, in proceedings by discharged cannery workers, including Mrs. Walker, for reinstatement with back
pay, showed a refusal by Mrs. Walker to answer the question,
"are you or were you ever a member of the Communist
Party!"
c. Statements to the following effect which appeared in
certain of the Reports of the Joint Fact-Finding Committee
on Un-American Activities in California for the years 1943,
1945, 1947, 1948 and 1949: That Mrs. Walker's O.P.A.
supervisor associated with persons said to be "members of the
Communist Party organization"; that "attorneys for the
Communist Party are" the firm of labor lawyers by whom Mrs.
\Valker was employed in 1944 to 1946; reporting the identity
of the Communist Political Association with the Communist
Party despite a change of name "for strategic reasons May
20-23 1944"; giving a biography of one Archie Brown, an
admitted Communist Party member and a candidate for
various public offices on that ticket and mentioning sponsors
of his from various unions including the United Office and
Professional Workers of America; and indicating that the
"People's Daily World," a newspaper, is "the official organ
of the Communist Party on the west coast."
d. Four issues of the "People's Daily World" contained
items concerning Mrs. Walker: her employment by the labor
law firm in February, 1944, was mentioned; she was listed as

)

796

f

;,

~. ~
~

I
i

OJ

'I)

v.

CU'l'TER IJABORATORIES

[43 C.2d

1944 ultcmal.(' delegate to a Slate COllllllittee of "the COlUmunist Polil.ieal Ass()(~iation"; and in October, 1946, a radio
program was noted which she conducted on behalf of a
committee ., for Archie Brown for Governor ... the Communist write-in candidate."
e. A photostatic copy of an unaddressed handwritten letter
dated "7/10/46" and signed with Mrs. Vlalker's maiden name
discussed the propriety of the introduction of a resolution on
the maritime strike at the Cannery Workers Club by the
writer and another, and stated t.hat "I tried to evaluate my
action, as I try to evaluate whatever I do, from the point of
view of the welfare of the working class and the strengthening
of the Party. ,.
f. 'I'\,;"/I •• unidentified undated documents contained biographicaJ material" about Mrs. Walker and stated, among
other things, that she was issued 1945 Communist Party
membership card No. 40360, that she joined the Communist
Party in 1942 and had held various positions in various clubs
and sections of the pat·ty inclnding the "Cannery Club,"
that her present husband was a Comm llnist Party member anel
organizer, and that in February, 1946, she listed on a Corn·
munist Party interview form the information that "she gave
up law practice because it was frustrating to work with people
she had to work with (namely, professional people)."
Mrs. Walker was not shown the above described evidence
when she was discharged. but was confronted with it at the'
arbitration board hearing, and company attorneys asked hN
a series of questions concerning it and her Communist .affilia
tions and a<.>tivities, including the questions, "Are you now
or have you ever been a member of the Communist Partyf"
and "Isn't it a fact. Mrs. Wa1ker . . . that the reason why
you sought employment . . . at Cutter Laboratories was
becau-se you felt and believed, and had it in mind, that by
obtaiuing that employment at that plant you could mor('
actively and more effectively carry 011 the program and the'
activities of the Comllluni~t Party T" 1VIr8. Walker's attorney
objected to the questions on the ::rrounds, among others, th;t
the political affiliations of an employe are immatel'ia1 and that
by not acting more promptly thl' company had waived the
Communism issue as a ground for discharge. The board over·
t"u1ed the objections but also announced that Mrs. WallH'r
would not be instruetcd to answc>r the questions" if she did
not care to do so, but that if shl' refused to ans\V('r \\"l' would
draw all justifiable inferences from the refusal." .Mrs. Walker
:l
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thereupon refused to answer the questions as an "unwarranted
invasion into my private beliefs." The ('vidence as to her
Communist membership and acceptance of party principles,
with all the implications that flow therefrom. thus stands
unchallenged and uncontradicted by her and clearly supports
the board's finding that the company honestly and correctly
believed her to be a knowing and deliberately acting Communist.
It was further found by the board that the company's ]947
investigation of Mrs. Walker indicated that she was a Communist and also disclosed most of the omissions and falsifications in her application for employment, that "a strong
case" had been made out that in 1048 the company learned
of her eannery activities and of the cannery hearings, and
that th('re was "at least a general indifference on the part of
the Company about Doris Walker's activities until the autumn
of 1949 and a specific indifference about obvious • . . cInes
to her background." The company stated that the reason they
(lid not discharge Mrs. Walker in'1947 was because of 8
·lcsire to "lean over backward" rather than to be accused of
harassing union officials and because company attorneys advised that there was at that time insufficient evidence to support a discharge.
Under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
in effect when Mrs. Walker was discharged, the company had
agreed not to interfere with, restrain or coerce employes or
,liscriminate against them because of membership or lawful
activity in the union. It further agreed that, except for
personnel reductions for lack of work or to effect economies,
it would not discharge an employe "except for just cause."
Both the union and the company also agreed that they will
not discriminate against "8 present or prospective employee
or member because of race, color, creed, national origin,
J'eligious belief, or Union affiliation"; formerly" political" as
well as "religious belief" was listed in this contract provision,
but by negotiation the word "political" was amended out of
the agreement. The board held that although removal of
the word" political" seemed to authorize the practice of dis·
\·rimination because of "political belief," "we are unable to
,onclude" that the company's agreements not to discriminate
! IPcause> of union activity and not to discharge except for just
,'uuse were thereby limited or modified "in such a way as to
dispose of this dispute." In this connection it is to be noted
that the old hoax that the Communist Party is but a political
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party has been effectively exposed, as is hereinafter shown in
some detail.
The company at the board hearings advanced two grounds
as the basis for discharging Mrs. Walker: "the omissions
and falsifications in the Application for Employment nnd
membership in the Communist Party with the full implications
of dedication to sabotage, force, violence and the like, which
Party membership is believed to entail." Although finding
that the company" honestly believed all of these things," and
that the "accuracy of those beliefs is established in the
record, " the board further found that the company had not
satisfactorily explained the delay of two years (from 1947 to
1949) in asserting the grounds for discharge presented to the
board and that such grounds were therefore stale. Finally,
it was found by the board that the reasons assigned by the
company were not its real reasons for discharging Mrs.
Walker, and that actuany the discharge, which occurred during wage negotiations, was (' retaliatory in nature" and" interfered with, restrained and coerced an employee hecause of
participation as an officer and negotiator on behalf of the
Union in a wage negotiation. " As already stated, the board's
award, based on the above findings, was that the company's
discharge of Mrs. Walker violated the collective bargaining
contract provisions against discrimination because of union
activity and against discharging except for just cause, and
that she is entitled to reinstatement aud to limited back pay.
The company failed to comply with the award, the union
petitioned the superior court for its confirmation, and the
company asked the court that it be vacated. (See Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 1287, 1288.) After a hearing the trial court confirmed the award, and this appeal by the company followed.
Section 1288 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, so
far as here material, that "In either of the following cases
the superior court . . . must make an order vacating the
award, upon the application of any party to the arbitration: ...
" (d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers . . ."
[1] As ground for reversal the company contends, among
other things and as it contended before the trial court in
seeking vacation of the award, that an arbitration award
which directs that a member of the Communist Party who is
dedicated to that party's program of "sabotage, force, violence and thf> lib-" b(' reinstatNl to employment in a plant
which produces antibiotics used bI both the military and

I,
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civilians is agaiust public IJoliey, as pxpressed in both {edcral
and state laws, is therefore illegaJ and void and will not be
enforced by the courts. With this contention we agree.
In the eaSe of Loving & Evans v. Blick (1949), 33 Ca1.2d
603 [204 P.2d 23], this court reversed a judgment confirming
an arbitrator's a\,,'ard of a disputed sum owing under a building contract where it appeared that only one of the partners
of the contracting firm was licensed as required by statute,
and that neither the other partner nor the partnership held
such a license. After referring to the principles that (p. 607)
"a contract made contrary to the terms of a law designed for
the protection of the public and prescribing a penalty for
the violation thereof is mega) and void, and no action may
be brought to enforce such con tract" and that (p. 509)
"ordinarily with respect to arbitration proceedings' the merits
of the controversy between the parties are flot subject to
judicial review' [citation] and that' arbitrators are not bound
by strict adherence to legal procedure and to the rules on the
admission of evidence expected in jydicial trials," it was held
(p. 610) that the "power of the arbitrator to determine the
rights of the parties is dependent upon the existence of a
valid contract under which such rights might arise," that
"Section 1281 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for
submission to arbitration of ' any controversy . . . which
arises out of a contract,' does not contemplate that the>
parties may provide for the arbitration of controversies aris·
ing out of contracts which are expressly declared by law to
be illegal and against the public policy of the state," that
(p. 611) "an unlawful transaction cannot be given legal
vitality by the arbitration process," that (p. 614) "the only
evidence before the trial court showed without contradiction
that the contract upon which the award was based was illegal
and void because of respondents' failure to comply with the
licensing requirements," and that therefore that court had
erred in confirming the award. And in Franklin v. Nat C.
Goldstone Agency (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 628, 630-633 [204 P.2d
37], a judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of
unlicensed contractors was likewise reversed upon the ground
that the basic contract was illegal because in violation of the
statutes and of "the public policy of this state."
It is at once apparent that the controversy now before us
presents an even stronger case for refusal to confirm the
award than was involved in the Loving & Evulls and in the
Franklin cases. There the illegality was held to exist in the
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upon whieh the uwal'ds wcrc based, while here fh~
very award itsdf is illegal in that it. orders reinstatement as an
employe of one whose d('r1i(~ation to and active support of
Communist principles and practices stands proved and unchallenged in the record. As is hereinafter shown, the true
implications of knowing membership in and support of the
Communist Party are no longer open to doubt, and the long
overworked party line theme that Communism is but a political activity has been exposed as a false and fraudulent stratagem designed particularly as a device for securing, in the free
nations having government by law, legal support for the
, , party" in carrying on to the end of its illegal objectives.
The Congress of the United States, in adopting the In'i;ernal
Security Act of 1950, declared the dangers of the Communist
movement in the following terms (Act of Sept. 23, 1950,
I'h. 1024, tit. I, § 2, 64 Stats. 987; 50 U.S.C.A. § 781) :
" As a result of evidence adduced before various committees
of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Congress
finds that" (1) There exists a world Communist movement which in
its origins, its development, and its present practice, is a
world-wide revolutionary movement whose purpose it is, by
treachery, deceit, infiltration into other groups (governmental
and otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other
means deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian
dictatorship in the countries throughout the world through
the medium of a world-wide Communist organization.
"(2) The establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship in
any country results in the suppression of all opposition to the
party in power, the subordination of the rights of individuals
to the state, the denial of fundamental rights and liberties
which are characteristic of a representative form of government, such as freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly,
and of religious worship, and results in the maintenance of
control over the people through fear, terrorism, and brutality ....
"(9) In the United States those individuals who knowingly
and willfully participate in the world Communist movement,
when they so participate, in effect repudiate their allegiance
to the United States, and in effect transfer their allegiance
to the foreign country in which is vested the direction and
control of the world Communist movement . . . .
" (15) The Communist movement in the United States is
an organization numbering thousands of udherents, rigidly
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and ruthlessly disciplined. Awaiting and seeking to advalWP
a moment when the United States may be so far extended
by foreign engagements, so far divided in counsel, or so far
in industrial or financial straits, that overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence may seem
possible of achievement, it seeks converts far and wide by an
extensive system of schooling and indoctrination. Such preparations by Communist organizations in other countries have
aided in supplanting existing governments. The Communist
organization in the United States, pursuing its stated objectives, tha recent successes of Communist methods in other
countries, and the nature and control of the world Communist
movement itself, present a clear and present danger to the
security of the United States and to the existence of free
American institutions, and make it necessary that Congress,
in order to provide for the common defense, to preserve the
sovereignty of the United States as an independent nation,
and to guarantee to each State a republi~an form of government, enact appropriate legislation recognizing the existence
of such world-wide conspiracy and designed to prevent it from
accomplishing its purpose in the United States."
And in the Smith Act (Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62
Stats. 808; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385) it was provided that "Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches
the • • • overthrowing or destroying the government of the
United States or . . . of any State . . . by force or violence,
or • • • Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize
any society, group, or assembly of persons who ... encourage
the overthrow or destruction of any such government by
force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates
with, any such ... assembly of persons, knowing the purposes
thereof" is guilty of a crime.
More recently, in adopting the Communist Control Act of
1954 (PuDlic Law 637, ch. 886, approved August 24, 1954),
our Congress further expressed its, and necessitates our,
awareness of the true nature of the party program and
methods, in these findings of fact: "Sec. 2. The Congress
hereby finds and declares that the Communist Party of the
United States, although purportedly a political party, is in
fact an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the
Government of the United States. It constitutes an authoritarian dictatorship within a republic, demanding for itself
the rights and privileges accorded to political parties, but
denying to a11 others the liberties guaranteed by the Consti<13 C.:.!rl-.2B

)

802

BLACK

1).

CUTTER LABORATORIES

f4;1 C.2,1

lilt illll.
tllld

)
/

fTnlikl' plliit ii'al part iI's, whleh I'\'olv(' thf'ir polif'if's
prograllls Ihrollglt pi/hli(' means, by the l'eeonciliatioll of

a wide varidy of individual views, and submit those polieies
and programs to the electorate at large for approval or disapproval, the policies and programs of the Communist Party
il['e secretly prescribed for it by the foreign leaders of the
world Communist movement. Its members have no part in
determining its goals, and are not permitted to voice dissent
i 0 party objectives.
Unlike members of political parties,
!llembers of the Communist Party are recruited for indoct rination with respect to its objectives and methods, and are
(lrganized, instructed, and disciplined to earry into action
..;Iavishly the assignments given them by their hierarchical
(·hieftains. Unlike political parties, the Communist Party
aeknowledges no constitutional or statutory limitations upon
its conduct or upon that of its members. The Communist
Party is relatively small numerically, and gives scant indica1ion of capacity ever to attain its ends by lawful political
'lleans. The peril inherent in its operation arises not from
: ts llumbers, but from its failure to acknowledge any limita'ion as to the nature of its activities, and its dedication. to
he proposition that the present constitutional Government
,f the United States ultimately must be brought to ruin by
tlly available means, including resort to force and violence.
; rolding that doctrine, its role as the agency of a hostile
foreign power renders its existence a clear present and eontinuing danger to the security of the United States. It is
the means whereby individuals are seduced into the service
of the world Communist movement, trained to do its bidding,
and directed and controlled in the conspiratorial performance
of their revolutionary services. Therefore, the Communist
Party should be outlawed."
A similar awareness was shown by the President of the
United States in his State of the Union message delivered
before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives on .January 7, 1954 (l00 Congressional Record
62, H. Doc. 251), wherein he declared, "The subversive chara.cter of the Communist Party in the United States has been
dearly demonstrated in many ways, including court proceedings. 'Ve should recognize by law a fact that is plain
to all thoughtful citizens-that we are dealing here with
actions akin to treason-that when a citizen knowingly participates in the Communist conspiracy he no longer holds
allegiance to the United States."
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And in this state the courts have recognized that the type
of activity found by the board here to have been clwarrcd
in
'" ~
by Mrs. \Valker-i.e., membership "in the Communist Party
with the full implications of dedication to sabotage, force,
violence and the like, which Party membership is believed to
entail "-constitutes a violation of the California Criminal
Syndicalism Act. (Pen. Code, §§ 11400-11402, formerly
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8428; see People v. McCormick
(1951), 102 Cal.App.2d Supp. 954, 962 [228 P.2d 349 J ;
People v. Chambers (1937), 22 Cal.App.2d 687, 709-713
[72 P.2d 746].)
The Legislature of California itself has found as facts,
and has so declared in section 1027.5 of the Government Code,
t.hat " . . . (a) There exists a world-wide revolutionary move·
ment to establish a totalitarian dictatorship based upon force
and violence rather than upon law . . . .
" (d) \Vithin the boundaries of the State of California
there are active disciplined communist o-rganizatiolls pres·
ently functioning for the primary purpose of advancing tht'
objectives of the world communism movement, which organ·
izations promulgate, advocate, and adhere to the precepts
and the principles and doctrines of the world communism
movement. These communist organizations are characterized
by identification of theil' programs, policies, and objectives
with those of the world communism movement, and they regularly and consistently cooperate with and endeavor to carry
into execution programs, policies and objectives substantially
identical to programs, policie!ll, and objectives of such worla
communism movement. . . .
"There is a clear and present danger, which the Legislature of the State of California finds is great and imminent,
that in order to advance the program, policies and objectives
of the world communism movement, communist organiza·
tions in the State of California and their members will en·
gage in concerted effort to hamper, restrict, interfere with.
impede, or nullify the efforts of the State and the publicagencies of the State to comply with and enforce the laws of
the State of California . . . "
Further evidencing the implications of membership in the
Communist Party and the policy of the state in respect there·
to, the I .. egislatul'e has declared that (Gov. Code, § 1028) :
"It sltall be suffieient eaus(' for the dismissal of an~' publil'
employee whell such public employee aavocat('s (l)' is Imow·
ingly a member of the Communist Party or of an organiza.
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tion which during the time of his membership he knows
advocates overthrow of the Government of the United States
or of any state by force or violence."
(See also Board of
Education v. Wilkinson (1954), 125 Cal.App.2d 100 [270
P.2d 82].) [2] A private employer, particularly one largely
engaged in supplying manufactured products to the govern·
ment, to its armed forces, and to retailers for distribution
through hospitals and doctors to the public at large, should
not be required by state action through its courts (see Skelley
v. Kt'aemer (1948), 334 U.S. 1 [68 8.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161,
3 A.L.R.2d 441]; Hurd v. Hodge (1948), 334 U.S. 24 [68
S.Ct. 847, 92 L.Ed. 1187]) to retain in or restore to employment a person who would not be entitled to state employment and who is known to have dedicated herself to the service of a foreign power and to the practice of sabotage to
the end of overthrowing our government.
Graphically depictive of the nature of the Communist conspiracy and of the extremes to which it is prepared to resort
are the following statements by Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Dennis v. United States (1951), 341 U.S. 494,
564-565 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137, 1181] : "The Communist
Party, nevertheless, does not seek its strength primarily in
numbers. Its aim is a relatively small party whose strength
is in selected, dedicated, indoctrinated, and rigidly disciplined
members. From established policy it tolerates no deviation
and no debate. It seeks members that are, or may be, secreted
in strategic posts in transportation, communications, industry,
government, and especially in labor unions where it can compel employers to accept and retain its members. It also
seeks to infiltrate and control organizations of professional
and other groups. Through these placements in positions of
power it seeks a leverage over society that will make up in
power of coercion what it lacks in power of persuasion.
"The Communists hav~ no scruples against sabotage, terrorism, assassination, or mob disorder; but violence is not with
them, as with the anarchists, an end in itself. The Communist
Party advocates force only when prudent and profitable.
Their strategy of stealth precludes premature or uncoordinated outbursts of violence, except, of course, when the blame
will be placed on shoulders other than their own. They
resort to violence as to truth, not as a principle but as an
expedient. Force or violence, as they would resort to it,
may never be necessary, because infiltration and deception
may be enough.

I
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"Force would ue utilizeu by tLe COlillHunist Party uot
to destroy government but for its capture. The Communist
recognizes that an established government in contro] of
modern technology cannot be overthrown by force until it
is about ready to fall of its own weight. Concerted uprising,
therefore, is to await that contingency and revolution is seen,
not as a sudden episode, but as the consummation of a long
process.' ,
Other instances of recognition by the courts of the clear
and present danger to this country and to its institutions
presented by the Communist Party and its adherents may be
found in decisions upholding the provisions of the IJahor
Management Relations Act of 1947, also known as the TaftHartley Act, (Act, June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 1 et seq.; 61
Stats. 136 et seq.; 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.), which deny the
privilege of being chosen as exclusive bargaining agent to a
union whose officers have not filed with the National Lahor
Relations Board their affidavits denying membership or affiliation with the Communist Party and denying belief in the
overthrow of the United States Government by force (see
American Oommunications Assn., 0.1.0. v. Douds (1950),
339 U.S. 382 [70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925] ; National Maritime
Union of America v. Herzog (D.C., 1948), 78 F.Supp. 146,
affirmed 334 U.S. 854 [68 S.Ct. 1529, 92 L.Ed. 1776] ; Inland
Steel 00. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7,1948),
170 F.2d 247, 264-267, affirmed 339 U.S. 382 [70 S.Ct. 674,
94 L.Ed. 925]), as well as in cases sustaining other legislation or Congressional inquiry directed at exposing and controlling Communist activities in this country. (See Lawson
v. United States (C.C.A., D.C., 1949), 176 F.2d 49, certiorari
denied, 339 U.S. 934 [70 S.Ct. 663, 94 L.Ed. 1352]; United
States v. DLlJlnis (C.C.A., 2, 1950), 183 F.2d 201, 212-213,
affirmed, Dennis v. United States (1951), supra, 341 U.S.
494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137] ; Barsky v. United States,
(O.C.A., D.C., 1948), 167 F.2d 241, 247, certiorari denied,
334 U.S. 843 [68 S.Ct. 1511, 92 L.Ed. 1767 j ; Galvan v. Press
(1953),347 U.S. 522, 529 [74 S.Ot. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911].) In
the Douds case, supra, the court pointed out that before enacting the Taft-Hartley Act "Congress had a great mass of
material before it which tended to show that Communi~ts
and others proscribed by the statute had infiltrated unioll
organizations not to support and further trade union objectives. including the advocacy of change by democratic
llletllOuS, but to make them a device by which commerce and
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ilHlllstl'Y might be clisruplp!l when the dictates of political

policy required such action." (P. 389 of 839 U.S.)
Also relevant are the following comments of the court in
Garner v. Board of Public Works (1950),98 Cal.App.2d 493,
498 [220 P.2d 958], affirmed, (1951), 341 U.S. 716 [71 S.Ct.
909, 95 L.Ed. 1317], in upholding an ordinance requiring a
loyalty oath for municipal employes: "One of the foundation
stones of private business is that the employe must be loyal
to his employer. Loyalty is implicit in the contract of hiring.
No private business can long succeed without the conscientious,
undivided support of its employes. The man or woman who
denies allegiance to his employment is, and should be, soon
separated from it. . • . And, so long as the employment continues, every employer has the right at any time to ask his
To the same effect is
employe to declare his loyalty."
the holding in National Labor Relations Board v. Inter·
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (1953), 346 U.S.
46~, 472 [74 8.Ct. 172, 98 L.Ed. 195], "There is no more
elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty
to his employer." (See also National Labor Relations Board
v. Jones &- Laughlin Steel Gorp. (1937), 301 U.S. 1, 45-46
[57 8.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352]; RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc. v. Jarrico (1954), 128 Cal.App.2d 172 [274
P.2d 928].) [3] From the array of congressional and legislative findings which have been quoted above, if not from the
common knowledge of mankind, it must be accepted as con·
clusively established that a member of the Communist Party
cannot be loyal to his private employer as against any directive of his Communist master.
[4] We are of the view, further, that the type of activity
engaged in by the employe here-membership in the Communist Party and sustained participation in its activities-is
one which as a matter of public policy the company should
not be held to have waived by its failure to discharge her
earlier than it did. [5] In the first place, it is an established
principle that parties cannot be estopped from relying on
defenses based on considerations of public policy, such as
illegal contracts. (See Fewel &- Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt (1941),
17 Cal.2d 85, 91 [109 P.2d 650J ; American Nat. Bank v. A.
G. Sommerville, Inc. (1923), 19] Cal. 364, 371 [216 P. 376].)
[6] In the second place, the cmploye's party membership
was not shown or evcLI asserted by her to have been an
instance of past error but appears, rather, to have been the
studied and calculated choice of a person of some intellectual
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attainment, and to have been persisted in on an active and
devoted basis even at the time of the board hearings. Thus
an entirely adequate ground for refusing to employ her
(whether by original refusal to hire or by discharge) was a
continuing one which was available to the employer at any
time during its existence. [7] In this connection it may
also be noted that the employer had not only the right to
protect itself and its customers against the clear and present
danger of continuing a Communist Party member in its
employ, but also the duty to take such action as it deemed
wise to preserve order in its plant and to protect its other
employes, both union and nonunion, against the same danger
and the possibility of "sabotage, force, violence and the like."
The company properly stated in its notice of discharge, as
related above, "The nature of our company's business requires more than the usual precaution against sabotage and
subversion. Upon a disclosure that any employe is a member
of the Communist Party . . • we con.ceive it to be the responsibility of management to take action." Knowing the
facts which the company knew, it is difficult to conceive of
any tenable defense which it could make, or which would be
entertained in this court, as against an action for damages
in a personal injury or wrongful death case arising from the
wilful adulteration of any of its products by Mrs. Walker
if it continued her in its employ and she should thereafter
take that means of party activity. That acts of sabotage by
Communists are reasonably to be expected at any time such
acts may be directed by the party leader is not open to
question, as has already been shown.
[8] The fact that the company was not specifically obliged
by any governmental regulation to discharge Mrs. Walker
affects in nowise its right to do so or the impelling public
policy which militates against the order for her reinstatement;
in this country, built as it has been upon the initiative and
self-reliance of its citizens, the government is expected to
step in only where the employer has failed or is unable to act
for himself, and he is not obligated to await a governmental
decree before taking steps to protect himself or to exercise
his right to discharge employes who upon the established
facts are dedicated to be disloyal to him, to be likewise disloyal to the Ameriean labor union they may purport to serve,
and who constitute a continuing risk to both the employing
company and the public depending upon the company's
products.
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This is not the first time that this court has been called
upon to recognize and give specific effect to the public policy
where its duty in the premises is clear. (See James v. Marinship Corp. (1944), 25 Ca1.2d 721 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R.
900] ; Hughes v. Superior Court (1948), 32 Ca1.2d 850 [198
P.2d 885], affirmed 339 U.S. 460 [70 8.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985] ;
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Inll. Assn. (1953), 41
Ca1.2d 567, 574-575 [261 P.2d 721] ; see also National Labor
Rel. Board v. Cincinnati Chem. Wks. (1944), 144 F.2d 597;
National Labor Relations Board v. KeZeo Corp. (1949), 178
F.2d 578.)
[9] Lastly, in the light of the undisputed evidence and
of the specific findings of fact made by the arbitration board,
it clearly appears that the conclusional finding that Mrs.
Walker was discharged because of her labor union activities
is untenable. We have here an exemplification of that which
Justice Jackson (in Dennis v. United States (1941), supra,
341 U.S. 494, 564 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137, 1181]) so
clearly envisaged when he said of the Communist Party:
"From established policy it tolerates no deviation and no
debate. It seeks members that are, or may be secreted in
strategic posts in . . . industry . . . and especially in labor
unions where it can compel employers to accept and retain its
members, " and of that to which the court referred when it
stated in American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds
(1950), supra, 339 U.S. 382, 389 [70 8.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925] :
"Congress [in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act] had a great
mass of material before it which tended to show that Communists and others proscribed by the statute had infiltrated
union organizations not to support and further trade union
objectives ••• but to make them a device by which commerce and industry might be disrupted • . ." The issue of
labor union activity herein is manifestly a false one, a subterfuge injected not to promote the cause of American labor
but to further the Communist Party line. Mrs. Walker, as
a Communist, was not at any time or in any of her activities
truly serving the cause of an American labor union or the
illterests of an American laboring man; she was but doing
the bidding and serving the cause of her foreign master who
"tolerates no deviation and 110 debate." Her activities, therefol'(>, upon allY reasonable view of the evidence and the
specific findi1lgs of fact, were 1Iot in truth union labor activities
but were Communist Part.y activities.
Of no small sigui1.h:ullce in this connection is the fact that
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at tllP Hrbitratioll hUi/l'tf IU'urillg Mrs. W;jlk~r was asked,
and she refused to aJls\,'cr the Itll('StiIJIl, "Isn't it a fact,
Mrs. Walker .•. that the reason why you sought employment . . . at Cutter Laboratories was because you felt and
believed, and had it in mind, that by obtaining that employment at that plant you could more actively and more effectively carryon the program and the activities of the Communist Party'" It is, we think, indisputable that if Mrs.
Walker sought and obtained employment at Cutter Laboratories so that she "could more actively and more effectively
carryon the program and the activities of the Communist
Party," her reinstatement in that employment would serve
no cause save that of the Communist conspiracy. The courts
of this country by making such an order would be but aiding
toward destruction of the government they are sworn to
uphold. The contract between Cutter Laboratories and the
Bio-Lab Union cannot be construed, and will not be enforced, to protect activities by a Communist on behalf of her
party whether in the guise of unionism or otherwise.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein
expressed.

Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-All the members of the conrt
agree that we are bound by the determination of the arbitrators- that for two and one-half years Doris Walker's com.,' While there is a work stoppage and a strike in this collective bargaining history [during Doris Walker's employment], both were directed
at wage and contract issues. There is no evidence of any work stoppage,
strike or other interference with production, the avowed ob.iective of
which was political, philosophical, subversive or revolutionary. . . •
"It is admitted that Doris Walker's conduct and the quality of her
work were no different in 1949 from what they were in 1947. It is uncontradicted on the record that all of the essential facts upon which tile
discharge was based were in existence in 1947 and some years before.
And finally, it is established to our satisfaction, by admission of the
Company and by proof, that the reasons assigned in 1949 by the Com·
pany for the discharge were both known and believed by the Company
in 1947.
"This statE" of the record raises a doubt that the Company ever took
the assigned grounds for discharge seriously. • • •
"Finally, it appears, by admission of the Company, that notwithstanding the 1947 investigative report, there was no further investigation
until the autumn of 1949. This is inexplicable to us if there was real
concern about the combination of Communist Party membe!'ship and the
omissions and fnlsili('ntions disclosed hy the 1947 in\'estigative report •
• , Frow. all of this we are Wl&ble to find any aatisfactorl excuse for
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mllnist affiliat.ions were a matter of indiffercnce to Clltter,
'hat. Cutter thcl'efore waived her commnlliHI: affiliat.ions as a
ground for discharging her, that it disehargcd her solely because of her lawful union activity, and that in doing so it
violated its collective bargaining agreement witb the Union.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1280-1293: Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp.
v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Ca1.2d 228, 233 [174 P.2d 44]] ; Sapp v.
Barenfeld, 34 Ca1.2d 515, 523 [212 P.2d 283]: Crofoot v.
Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 185 f260 P.2d
l56] ; sce Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Ca1.2d 603, 609 f204
P.2(1 23].) It would seem necessarily to follow that we should
affirm the judgment of the superior court confirming the
a ward. The majority opinion holds, however, "that an arbitration award which directs that a member of the Communist

J

)

the Company's delay of over two years in asserting the grounds for discharge presented here. Contract relationships lose effectiveness if griev·
ances about performance are not promptly discussed, settled or brought
to an issue. This cuts both ways: unadjusted dissatisfactions of either
employer or employees cumulate and exaggerate the importance of en·
suing minor dissatisfactions. It seenlS to us that a commonplace of any
'just' system of discipline is the swift imposition of the penalty upon
the heels of discovery of the offense. Under an agreement like this one,
an employer should not be entitled to carry mutually known grounds for
discharge in his hip pocket indetinitely for future convenient use.
, 'In view of the foregoing considerations, we find that the grounds
asserted by the Company for the discharge were stale. . . .
"The discharge of a top Union official and negotiator at a passionate
climax in the middle of a stubbornly contested wage negotiation, stand·
ing alone, raises an inference that the discharge is retaliatory in nature
and designed to restrain, coerce or interfere with the employee because
of lawful Union activity. And we find convincing circumstantial evidence to support this inference.
"Two things that had lain fallow appear to have come to life when
the Union opened the agreement for wage adjustment in June of 1949.
The Company then put into use a new form of Application for Employment which for the first time asked questions about religion and Com·
munist affiliation. Then also, for the first time in over two years, the
Company ordered a fresh investigation into Doris Walker's Communist
affiliations.
"The discharge took place in a wave of heat over a radio broadcast
and a newspaper advertisement, neither of which was complimentary.
But they do not appear to have made any original contribution to the
usual exchanges that go on during most wage negotiations.
"While the quality of Doris Walker's conduct and performance on the
job remained unchanged 4'or three years, her position of importance in
the Union had progressively increased. It was only a few months before
the wage negotiation opened that she was elected President of the Local;
and she was a memher of the Union negotiating committee. . . •
"In view of all of the foregoing considerations, we find that Doris
Walker was unjustly discharged, that the reasons assigned by the Company for the discharge were not the real reasons and had been waived,
and that the discllarge interfered with, restrained and coerced an
employee because of participation as an officer and negotiator on behalf
of the Union in a wage negotiation."
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Party who is dedicated to that party's program of 'sabotage,
force, violence and the like' be reinstated to employment in
a plant which produces antibiotics used by both the military
and civilians is against public policy, as expressed in both
federal and state laws, is therefore illegal and void and will
not be enforced by the courts." Thus, even though an em·
ployer is indifferent to the fact that an employee is a Communist and is therefore no longer free under a collective
bargaining contract to discharge him for being a Communist.
it can nevertheless violate its contract not to discharge him
for lawful union activity and use the fact that he is a Communist as an excuse for its unlawful action. It can do so
because this court holds that the employment of a Communist poses such a threat to the security of the country that
a contract by an employer with a union to keep a known
Communist in its employ is against public policy and is therefore illegal. A fortiori such a contract by an employer with
the employee is illegal. Thus by judicial.fiat, but without the
temerity to declare that Communists are deprived of civil
rights (see Civ. Code, § 1556), the court abrogates not only
the right of employers and unions to contract for the employment of Communists, but the right of Communists as a
class to enter into binding contracts. It does so by invoking
public policy in violation of clearly stated policies of the
Legislature (Civ. Code, § 1556; Lab. Code, § 923; Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 1280-1293) and in a field in which Congress and
the Legislature have clearly indicated their competence to deal
with the problems involved.
Section 1556 of the Civil Code provides that "All persons
are capable of contracting, except minors, persons of unsound
mind, and persons deprived of civil rights."
(See also
1 Williston on Contracts [rev. ed.] § 222, pp. 669-670.) To
deny persons other than those mentioned in this section the
right to enter into employment contracts is to repeal pro tanto
its provisions with respect to the class of contracts of greatest
importance to those who must work for a living. Even if this
court were at liberty so to repeal the statute, there are compelling reasons why it ~hould not do so.
It is true that in thj~ case only an employment contract is
involved. Th.;re is not.hing in the rationale of the majority
opinioll, however, that limits its application to such contracts.
If it is illegal to employ a Communist, is it illegal to allow
a Communist unemployment benefits T If the threat of communist activity makes an employment contract with a known
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Communist illegal as against public policy, does it not also
invalidate other contracts T 'l'hus, can a landlord break his
lease with a Communist on th~ ground that his building may
be sabotaged Y Can a buyer refuse to accept and pay for
goods purchased from a Communist on the ground that they
may contain cleverly concealed defects Y Can a seller refuse
to deliver goods sold to a Communist on the ground that they
may be used to promote communist activities Y Can an owner
refuse to pay for construction work by a licensed contractor
who is a Communist' Indeed, can a Communist be licensed
as a contractor Y If contracts with Communists are illegal,
cannot Communists themselves violate them with impunity T
If breaches of contract can be defended on the ground that
one of the parties is a Communist, certainly a hearing will
not be denied the alleged Communist on the issue of whether
or not he is a Communist. The communist problem, which the
court has thus injected into private litigation, may therefore
dominatp all snch liti!1"ation and become one of the principal
preoccupations of courts. To what end f Certainly private
litigation does not lend itself to the formulation of a solution
to the problem of what to do with Communists. It is a rash
assumption that Congress and the Legislature have been
inept in their consideration or the problem, or are incapable
of meeting it, or that astride the "unruly horse" of public
policy (National Auto. Ins. Co. v. Winter, 58 Cal.App.2d 11,
22 (136 P.2d 22]) courts are better able to meet it.
It is obvious that Cutter cannot properly invoke public
policy on its own behalf. Doris \Valker's work was satisfactory and her union activities were consistent with legitimate trade-union objectives. Her presence at Cutter presented
at most a threat that she might attempt to use her position
for subversive activities. That risk, however, was one that
Cutter itself did not consider serious enough to disqualify
her for employment, and it has been materially lessened by
the fact that her communism has been thoroughly exposed.
As an afterthought, Cntter now uses this threat as an excuse
not ouly for discharging her for lawful union activity in
violation of its contract, but for attacking an arbitration
award that it had agreed should be "final and binding" upon
it. By sanctioning these violations of Cutter's contract this
COllrt not only defeats the public policy in favor of employee
organization free of employer interference and coercion (Lab.
Code, § 923; National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151
et seq.) and the public policy in favor of the settlement of

v. CUTTER LABORATORIES
R13
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gress has already undertaken to formulate a workable policy.
(50 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq.)
It is true that there are sensitive areas in which no Com·
munist should be employed. We cannot assume. however.
that the security system established by the federal govern·
ment is not adequate to protect these areas from subversivt'
persons. As the very authorities cited in t.he majority opinioll
make clear, neither Congress in enacting subversive control
legislation nor the executive department in enforcing it has
been insensitive to the nation's security. To date, however,
Congress has not seen fit to make mere membership in the
Communist Party a crime or to prohibit persons from entering
into employment or other contracts with Communists. Similarly, the executive department has not undertaken to
prosecute all Communists under the Smith Act. (18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2385.) It is not the policy of the United States that all
Communists are without legal rights and should be interned.
So long as they may legally remain at large they shonld be
allowed to earn a living. Even resident enemy aliens, whose
activities have not been restricted by Congress or the President, may engage in time of war in ordinary activities and
make binding contracts of employment or other contracts.
(Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 74 [63 8. Ct. 115, 87 L.Ed.
58] ; Heiler v. Goodman's Motor Express Van & S. 00., 92
N.J. 415 [105 A. 233, 235-236, 3 A.L.R. 336]; Techt v.
Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 239 [128 N.E. 185, 11 A.L.R. 166];
State v. Dar-win, 102 Wash. 402 [173 P. 29, 30-31, L.R.A.
1918F 1012].)
It must be obvious that in passing on the validity of
ordinary employment contracts in litigation between private
parties, courts are in no position effectively to evaluate the
security factors that should determine what jobs Communists
should or should not hold. In its finding of necessity for the
enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.A.
§ 781 et seq.) Congress demonstrated its awareness of the
communist problem and specifically established in that act
the policy of the United States with respect to the employment of Communists. It did not prohibit all hiring of Communists nor did it leave to the courts the decision as to what
jobs Communists might hold. It provided instead that the
Secretary of Defense should determine and designate the
defense facilities in which members of Communist-action
.Jan.1955]
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IwganizatiollS should not be- employed. - Cutter has not been
so designated, and wc may therefore assume that the employment of a Communist at Cutter poses no threat to the
security of the country. I see no evidence of congressional
incompetence or of executive negligence in this respect. nor
do I see any evidence of superior wisdom, facilities, or techniques available to this court that would justify its intrusion
into policy malting in this field. It is my opinion that we can
still safely leave to the legislative branch of the government
the formulation of policies for the security of the country,
and I would therefore affirm the judgment.
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied February
16, 1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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·Section 784(a) of the act provides that" When a Communist organ·
ization .. is registered or there is in effect a final order of the
LSubversive Activities Control] Board requiring such organization to
register, it shall be unlawful-- (1) For any member of such organiza'
tion • . . (D) if such organization is a Communist-action organization,
to engage in any employment in any defense facility." Section 784(b)
provides that "The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to
designate and proclaim .. _ a list of facilities • • . with respect to the
operaticn of which he finds and determines that the security of the
United States requires the application of the provisions of subsectioD
(a) of this section."

